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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Coordination of collective bargaining in Spain 
 
Spain is characterised by the existence of a multi-level bargaining structure, with a 
historically weak articulation between levels (Martin and Alos 2003). In the early years after 
the transition to democracy, collective bargaining occurred at several levels, with 
negotiations at territorial (provincial) sector level being the most significant in terms of 
workers covered. However, negotiations took place at several instances, and the issues 
were very often re-negotiated at lower levels, hence leading to cascading negotiations. The 
hierarchy principle in the Workers’ Statute made it very difficult for company level 
agreements to lower the conditions negotiated at higher level. Peak agreements in the early 
1980s contributed to maintain a formally high level of centralization, but after its 
abandonment since the mid-1980s, a process of gradual de-centralization occurred due to 
the lack of a clear articulation between bargaining levels. Even though bargaining took 
place at several levels, the main bargaining locus became the sector at provincial level (Del 
Rey 2003). The limited presence of unions at enterprise level hindered the efficacy of 
collective negotiations at higher levels because only occasionally they affected workers in 
small and medium-sized establishments. Because of the above, collective bargaining was 
very sensitive to changes in the strategies, preferences and power of actors, hence lacking 
stability and becoming a source of permanent conflict, as showed by the comparatively high 
conflict rates.  
 
After the unilateral regulation of collective bargaining in the early 1990s, that 
extended the use of opting out clauses thus contributing to a ‘de facto’ disorganised 
decentralization, social partners signed a number of agreements in the late 1990s for a 
consensus-based rebuilding of industrial relations. These were the AIEE (Agreement on 
Employment Stability), AICV (Agreement on the Extension of Collective Bargaining) and 
AINC (Agreement on Collective Bargaining), signed in 1997. The AICV helped to speed up 
and give greater coherence to the substitution of the Labour Ordinances by collective 
agreements. The AINC focused exclusively on the reform of collective bargaining processes 
and structure. 
 
Since then, peak cross-sectoral agreements have become a keystone of collective 
bargaining coordination and governability in Spain, setting (non-binding) guidelines for 
social partners at sectoral and company level. These agreements have promoted a top-
down, organised form of de-centralisation through the recovery of bargaining power of 
national federations whilst preserving firms' capacity to adapt the conditions set at higher 
levels to their specific needs. 
 
The trend towards collective bargaining decentralization accelerated in the context 
of the Great Depression and shifted towards a bottom-up, disorganised character after its 
unilateral regulation in 2012. This reform not only enhanced the regulatory capacity of 
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company level agreements, but it also gave more regulatory power to employers, eroded 
the regulatory capacity of sector level agreements, and put a limit to the duration of 
collective agreements after expiry.  
 
This has made clear the unstable equilibrium in industrial relations of statist 
varieties of capitalism. The threat of unilateral state regulation is always present and 
increases with exogenous shocks. Because of this, social partners’ incentives to build strong 
self-regulation capacities may decrease. This will at the same time generate new demands 
for government regulation. Thus, industrial relations change in the Mixed Market Economies 
of Southern Europe will accordingly be characterised by being most of the times induced 
exogenously, state-driven and radical (Molina and Rhodes 2007).  
 
However, the peak cross sectoral agreements governing and coordinating collective 
bargaining have exhibited significant resilience notwithstanding the unilateral interventions 
in industrial relations. Bi-partite social dialogue between unions and employers has 
remained well alive during the crisis and has contributed to an increasing awareness of the 
need to enhance the capacity of collective agreements to adapt to changing conditions 
through internal flexibility. 
 
1.2. The Collective bargaining process and social networks  
 
Just like any other element of industrial relations in Spain, the bargaining process is subject 
to detailed statutory regulation. Chapter III of the Labour Code defines who can sit at the 
bargaining table, how should the bargaining process start, and the development of the 
bargaining process. Trade union representatives in multi-employer bargaining (MEB) and 
works council members in company level are the actors on the union side. Similarly, 
employer representatives in multi-employer bargaining and management in single 
employer bargaining (SEB) are the actors involved in negotiations. Both in MEB and SEB, 
the criteria used to determine the parties involved and their number in the negotiating table 
is established according to results of works council elections. 
 
The increase in the number and technical complexity of issues negotiated in 
collective agreements, has led to the incorporation in the bargaining teams of trade unions 
and employers of external advisers (Sanguineti 2002). As the representatives of trade 
unions and employers do not necessarily have the technical knowledge and skills to 
negotiate on the wide range of issues covered by collective agreements, the participation 
of these advisers becomes an important element in order to ensure the success of 
negotiations. These external advisers can be other members of the participating 
organisations not involved in the bargaining committee, or a person external to them. For 
this reason, the advisers’ role will be limited to supporting other actors but will not have 
voice in the process.  
 
Another important characteristic of industrial relations in Spain, which has a 
relevant impact on the bargaining process is the fragmentation in the trade union 
landscape. This fragmentation occurs along several axis, including the ideological, territorial 
or the scope of union action and organizational logic (class, occupation, company etc.). Even 
though the number of trade unions represented varies significantly across sectors, 
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companies and regions, this is an element with important repercussions in the bargaining 
process. First, because it obliges trade unions to develop what Walton and McKersie (1991) 
call intra-organizational bargaining, a process aimed to reach consensus among all the 
parties involved in the union side.  
 
Even though the Labour Code is very specific when it comes to establishing the 
criteria for those actors involved in the bargaining process, it only provides general 
orientations around the development of the bargaining process, thus opening the door to 
the use of different strategies by the actors involved in order to enhance their bargaining 
position or facilitate reaching an agreement. The bargaining process starts with setting up 
the negotiating commission (Mesa de Negociación / Comisión Negociadora) whereby all 
actors represented within the functional scope of the collective agreement recognise each 
other (based on their representativeness) and designate those who will represent them in 
the negotiating commission. This is then followed by a series of events including meetings 
(formal and informal; bilateral or multilateral; intra-organizational and inter-organizational 
etc.), information exchange, press communications, strikes and demonstrations etc. The 
specific context of the company / sector will determine the network of actors involved, but 
also the dynamics in the bargaining process and the events. 
 
 
2. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS IN THE LITERATURE ON 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SPAIN 
 
Research on industrial relations in Spain is largely dominated by legal analyses and 
approaches as a result of its highly regulated character. Economic, sociological or psico-
social studies also exist and are growing in number, but still represent a relatively small 
proportion of the research made on the field. As a result of this, institutional and legal 
approaches dominate the research scene in industrial relations in Spain. Moreover, there is 
a very limited set of methodologies and little methodological innovation and 
experimentation in the field. To this we have to add the lack of adequate datasets available 
to carry out research in the field.  
 
As a consequence of the above, the relational approach and the use of social 
network analysis has been absent from the literature in the field. The only exception to this 
is the work by B. Roca, that have used the notion of network to study trade union 
recruitment strategies (2016), but also solidarity networks among migrant workers. There 
is no research to date that applies a relational approach to the analysis of collective 
bargaining. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Case selection 
 
To apply that relational approach to the analysis of collective bargaining coordination, the 
NETWIR project decided to select two sectors as case studies in the four countries analysed: 
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Retail and Pharmaceutical industry. However, in the Spanish context this selection is 
focused with certain peculiarities (as it is further explained below in sections 4.1.2 and 
4.2.1). Collective bargaining in the Retail trade sector in Spain is dualized along company 
size: large retailers having their own collective agreement at national sector level, while 
small retailers and other activities within the retail trade sector develop collective 
bargaining at several levels. In that regard, the network analysis of collective bargaining has 
been carried out for the negotiation of the large retailers. In the other hand, for the 
pharmaceutical sector, the collective bargaining process is developed together with the 
chemical sector in Spain, being a well-established process functioning as a sectoral national 
framework. Therefore, the network analysis of collective bargaining is carried out for the 
negotiation of the whole chemical sector (including pharma). In that regard, we carry out 
two inverse processes in the selection of cases: we focus on one part of Retail sector (Large 
retailers) while broadening the sectoral selection of Pharma (Chemical sector). 
 
3.2. The sample 
 
As the research has develops two-mode networks analysis, the samples of both sectors 
consist not only of actors, but also events. Each sectoral case study’s population try to 
include all the actors involved in collective bargaining coordination in Large retail and 
Chemical sectors. In that sense, a first actors’ census was bult relying on semi-structured 
interviews with key actors (Table 1), contributing to elaborate the final census of actors for 
each sectoral case study. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the number of key actors’ interviews held 
 Large retail  Chemical  
Employers’ side 3 3 
Trade unions 2 4 
 
The period considering in the analysis is 4-5 years, reconstructing the network of 
each sectoral collective bargaining process in this period of time (particularly during the 
negotiation of the sectoral last collective agreement at national level). In that sense, the 
research traced back the coordination events taking place in that process, but also the 
actors involved. 
 
Table 2: Overview of the number of type of events in the Chemica-Pharmal case study 
 Formal  Informal Mixed 
Employers’ side 1 1 - 
Trade unions 4 - 1 
Both actors 1 9 1 
 
The census of actors for the chemical-pharmaceutical sector included a large 
number of actors (50), due mainly to the early access to the official minutes of the 
negotiation table, although subsequent interviews with key actors reduced that number 
(44). Regarding the census of events, the high number of semi-structured interviews to 
these key actors (7) allowed to have an extensive list of events (17), gathering formal, 
informal and mixed events from both trade union and business organizations (Table 2). 
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Table 3: Overview of the number of type of events in the Large retail case study 
 Formal  Informal 
Employers’ side 1 1 
Trade unions 2 2 
Both actors 3 1 
 
In regard to the Large Retail case study, its initial census counted with 25 actors, 
although key actors granted access to 21 of them, due to lack of relevance in the CB 
process, potential reiteration of information provided or because they were no longer 
members of the negotiating organizations. Regarding the census of events, the lower 
access to key actors is also reflected in a smaller initial compilation of events (10), in this 
case without mixed formal / informal ones (Table 3). 
 
3.3. Evaluation of the data collection 
 
The survey was distributed through SurveyMonkey on-line platform to all these individuals 
finally indicated by key actors considered as individuals that were part of the negotiation 
process at some point, influenced the negotiation process and/or were part of the social 
network. Each individual received a personal invitation with a personalized message in 
order to increase the response rate (customizing names, organizations, positions and even 
the person who provided the contact). Periodic reminders were programmed depending on 
the state of each survey response (survey not opened, no response, not completed, etc.). In 
the many cases of no response after several reminders, we established contact through 
email and/or telephone. Also, in the numerous cases of individuals who were not 
completing the network part of the survey, but only the sectoral context questions. 
 
Table 4: Responses to the questionnaire 
 Large retail  Chemical  
Initial census of actors 25 50 
No contact information 4 5 
No response 11 17 
Partial response 1 5 
Completed survey 9 23 
Total responses 10 28 
 
The data collection results (Table 4) shows the relevance of very initial collaboration 
of actors together with the influence of the coordination itself within actors to participate in 
such studies analysing their interactions within CB negotiations. In that sense, chemical 
bargaining actors have seen clearer the benefits of participation in this type of research for 
them. Regardless, information about people that did not respond to the questionnaire is 
removed from most of the analyses for ethical reasons. Consequently, the results should be 
interpreted taking consideration they only shed light on that part of the network that filled 
out the survey. 
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4. SECTORAL ANALYSIS  
 
4.1. Pharmaceuticals 
 
4.1.1.  Socio-economic situation of the sector 
 
The Pharmaceutical industry is a strategic sector for all countries considering its impact on 
public health and other industry sectors, much more in light of the current pandemic crisis. 
The intensive activity in scientific and technological research of this sector has its global 
epicentre in Europe (together with the US). In this regard, Spain is the 9th European Union 
member state exporter and the 12th country at global level in the pharma industry (OECD 
2018). Specifically, 353 companies (most of them large-sized) represented the 1.17% of 
the Spanish GDP, employing 42,653 workers (INE 2017), together with 160 thousand 
indirect jobs (Farmaindustria 2018). It is important to take in consideration also data of the 
chemical industry for the case of Spain since both sectors are within the same collective 
bargaining process. Thereunder, the chemical sector employs 89,908 employees (together 
with 340 thousand indirect jobs (FEIQUE 2019)) concentrated in a wider number of 
companies (3,542), contributing to the 3.45% of the Spanish GDP (INE 2017). In fact, sales 
of the chemical-pharmaceutical industry grew by 13.5% in 2018, thus contributing the 
18.2% of the total Spanish industry (INE 2018). 
 
Figure 1: Variation of employment in Chemical, Pharmaceutical and all sectors in the period 
2009 – 2017 in regard to 2008 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on Companies Structural Statistic and Active Population Survey (INE 2020) 
 
Moreover, the chemical-pharmaceutical sector has not only better economic 
indicators than the Spanish average, but also in terms of employment. The pharmaceutical 
sector resisted better the impact of the past economic crisis, even increasing the number 
of workers in 2017 compared to 2008 (5.6%). In contrast, the Spanish economy had 7.3% 
less workers than at the start of the (3.9% less in the case of the chemical sector) (Graph 
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1). Similar trends in terms of working conditions: the chemical-pharmaceutical activities 
count with much higher salaries (Graph 1), better figures of permanent contracts (93% of 
permanent employment compared to 73% of the national average), higher rates of full-
timers (97% - 98,5% in front of the 85.2% national average) and higher participation of 
women (the pharma industry employs the double of women than the Spanish industry 
average (52%)) (INE 2018, FEIQUE 2019 and Farmaindustria 2018). 
 
Graph 1: Annual salary average (2018) in Chemical and Pharmaceutical industries in 
comparison with economic sectors and national average1 
  
Source: Annual survey of labour costs (INE 2020) 
 
 
In any case, the workforce of the sector is highly qualified: the pharma sector counts 
with 62% of highly educated workers in front of the 42% of the national average 
(Farmaindustria 2018). Likewise, there is larger proportion of large companies in the 
pharmaceutical industry (and in a lesser extent in the chemical industry), mostly located in 
the metropolitan area of Barcelona. The most important firms are Novartis (with 1,806 
employees in Spain), Boehringer (1,600), Ferrer Internacional (1,180), Teva (785) and Pfizer 
(767)2. In that regard, it should be noted that (at least for the case of Spain) there is a direct 
correlation between the existence of workers' representation and union affiliation at 
company level, and the larger size of companies (Alós et al., 2015). Thus, the 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies’ composition should therefore have an effect to 
greater skills of workers' representatives in collective bargaining. 
 
4.1.2. Single and multi-employer collective bargaining 
 
The collective bargaining process for the pharmaceutical sector is developed together with 
the chemical sector in Spain. Thus, the main social actors in the CB process represent 
companies and workers of the chemical / pharmaceutical sector. FEIQUE (Business 
Federation of the Spanish Chemical Industry) is the most representative employer 
association, defending the interests of the chemical sector firms in Spain since 1977. 
FEIQUE represents (directly and indirectly through its territorial and subsector associations) 
                                         
1 National average excluding agriculture and domestic activities. 
2 Data gathered from companies’ annual reports and internal information for year 2017 or 2018. 
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more than 1,500 chemical companies located in Spain, which together generate 75% of 
Spanish chemical production. Among its members is Farmaindustria (Pharmaceutical 
Industry employer association), established in 1963, which gathers the majority of the 
innovative pharmaceutical laboratories (now 155), the 94% of workers in the 
pharmaceutical industry and the 90% of the current market for original medicines in Spain. 
Likewise, it is worth highlighting an actor also relevant in the collective bargaining process 
of the chemical industry in Spain: Arinsa, a firm of labour lawyers and experts in industrial 
relations, which since the 70s advises FEIQUE and negotiates directly with unions in 
collective bargaining processes in the sector. 
 
On the union side, CCOO-Industria (the Federation of Industry of Working 
Committees union) is the trade union with more active members within the chemical sector 
(15,005 in 2014), followed of UGT-FICA (the Federation of Industry, Construction and 
Agriculture of the General Union of Workers) with 6,614 active members, according to the 
EurWork database (Eurofound 2014). There are others regional unions that are considered 
representative within the sector, participating in the sectoral collective bargaining process 
at national level but not signing the agreement (e.g. CIG - Galician Interunion Confederation) 
or even refusing to participate in the process (e.g. ELA - Basque Workers Solidarity union). 
 
The collective bargaining in the chemical sector (which includes the pharmaceutical 
sector) is a well-established process with a long history since the beginning of the 
democratic phase in Spain: the first agreement was negotiated in 1978, counting with 18 
agreements signed nowadays. This is therefore a CB process with strong coordination at 
sectoral and national level: the last agreement (signed in 2018) covers 3,100 companies 
and 242,500 workers in the sector. In this sense, both employers and workers 
representatives with long trajectories negotiating in the chemical sector asses that the 
chemical agreement is a reference for other sectoral CB processes and for also for company 
level negotiations (within and out of the sector). In that regard, some of the most relevant 
companies in the sector have their own collective agreements (despite participating in the 
sectoral negotiation process): that is the case of Repsol, Michelin, Briston (Firestone) and 
especially Fertiberia. Although currently the negotiation at company level prevails over 
sectoral in the current Spanish labour regulatory framework, workers and employers’ 
representatives of the chemical sector propose and recommend that companies with their 
own agreement should adhere to the sectoral agreement in areas already agreed. Likewise, 
other companies adhering to the sectoral agreement negotiate at company level the so-
called “articulated pacts”: negotiated documents adapting the sectoral agreement to the 
reality of the company, also including additional agreements on areas not covered by the 
sectoral agreement. The most relevant articulated pacts are those of the companies Bayer, 
BASF and Ercros. 
 
Regarding the last sectoral agreement (2018), it includes: minimum wages, 
average wage increases of 2.50% (with increasing salary revision clauses) and salary 
supplements according to seniority, absenteeism, night-shifts, etc.; 30 working days of 
holidays; not mandatory overtime; clauses to limit temporary work and subcontracting; 
functional mobility clauses; and instructions to negotiate equality plans in al company sizes 
(anticipating national intersectoral regulation in this regard). This is reflected in the good 
working conditions of the sector compared to the rest of the Spanish economy reflects. 
Although the negotiation process of the sector starts from great consensus, 38 articles have 
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been modified in the last agreement. These have been bargained through three negotiating 
commissions (Equality, Professional Classification and Training) organized around four 
thematic items: Positive action, equality and licenses; Occupational health, environment 
and union rights; Employment, classification and professional training, and functional and 
geographical mobility; and Workday, wages and other issues. 
 
However, beyond the formal mechanisms during the negotiation process, both the 
exploratory interviews and the survey responses show a prominent importance to informal 
interactions during the negotiation: informal multilateral events are considered the most 
relevant after the formal multilateral ones. That is the case of the so-called “days of 
coexistence” in which members of the FEIQUE team, sub-sectoral, professional and/or 
provincial partner associations hold informal pre-negotiation event for days. That is also the 
case of dinners between unions and employers’ representatives during the negotiation final 
stage (to which prominent members of the organizations are also invited although they are 
not currently participating in the negotiation). In any case, the importance of formal 
collective events prevails in the employer and union sides: both hold formal coordination 
meetings before and during the negotiation to unify criteria in the negotiation. In any case, 
some employer side members encourage that one of the main obstacles in the negotiation 
is the lack of coordination between the unions. Moreover, some of the actors interviewed 
highlighted the relevance of the “Reduced Commission”, developed during the final phase 
of the negotiation (prior to the drafting commission) in which two or three members of each 
organization hold two or three meetings to unblock certain aspects of the negotiation. The 
relevance of this event lies in its formal call while its development is informal (that is, official 
but without minutes). Members of the commission are required to negotiate without 
previous positions of the organizations, developing the meetings in an open, without conflict 
and in trust environment, all with a single goal: to find solutions to the demands of each 
organization. In other words, the negotiation process uses informal mechanisms in a formal 
event for the success of the negotiation. 
 
4.1.3. Network Analysis of CB in Pharmaceuticals: Survey results 
 
Response rates, sample description, influence and involvement 
 
Regarding the results of the analysis of social networks in the sector, the social actors in 
the chemical sector in Spain have responded very positively, showing high collaboration and 
participation in the objectives of the study with 28 survey respondents. However, the 
response rate is 56% due to the bigger exploratory network size (50), due to the accessibility 
and transparency sharing information about every individual participating in the sectoral CB 
process. However, five participants declined to respond to network questions, so specific 
response rates can be computed for networks dividing the number of respondents to these 
questions by the network size. Therefore, respondent rate decline to 46%. Anyhow, as 
explained in the methodological section, networks size have been finally delimited based 
on a standardized criterium for all countries and sectors: network members are only those 
actors with a perceived influence on wage-setting higher than 1.5 (median value from a 
minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5 in a Likert scale). The relevant issue for the Chemical 
/ Pharma sector in Spain is that figures remain, being the only case of the research with all 
its initial network members with wage-setting influence index higher than 1.5. 
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Concerning the composition of the sample, we had a high response from both 
employers (18) and union representatives (10). Likewise, the sample has a balanced 
distribution also of political (15) and technical (12) profiles. And with a greater response 
from women compared to the rest of the countries studied, although with similar 
proportions (9 women in front of 19 men). In other regard, the perceived influence of each 
actor shows the influence that each respondent has on wage setting according to others' 
perceptions (computed based on median value from a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5 
in a Likert scale). The 53.5% of pharma actors have 4 or more median influence (similar to 
the 54.8% of the pharma actors in the other countries). 
 
About the involvement in the bargaining process, most of the individual actors have 
participated in the Chemical / Pharma negotiations for more than five years (67.9%), higher 
than the average in the sector in the rest of the countries (56.8%). This is somehow sign of 
the consolidation of the bargaining process in the sector, with long-standing relationships 
not only between organizations but also between individuals themselves with relationships 
of trust established over decades of negotiations. In any case, this does not prevent the 
Chemical pharma actors from participating in the negotiation processes of other sectors, 
mainly manufacturing and agriculture, but also services and transport. The main reason 
behind is the multi-sectoral nature of union federations, but also the involvement labour 
lawyers firm advising the employer side in several collective bargaining processes such as 
chemical and large retail. 
 
Event attending, form of interaction and main challenges for coordinating 
 
We refer by events to any significant development for wage-setting in the sector, both 
formal and informal, whenever they occurred in the period under consideration and had a 
direct influence / impact on the wage-setting process in the sector. Although events at 
micro (company) level or macro (economy) could be included, the meso (sector) level is the 
predominant level in the events of the Chemical pharma in Spain. In that regard, the mean 
of attendings in the sector in Spain is around 7 (same of the average of every country 
studied), while the proportion of event attending is around 85% (meaning the maximum 
number of events attended for any actor of the network), higher than the average of the 
rest of cases (72%). It should be noted that actors attending more events are not necessarily 
those with higher influence in wage setting. Although Pearson’s correlation between the % 
of events attended and the perceived influence differs among countries (Table 1), this 
correlation is only significant in Spain due to its statistical sample. 
 
Table 1: Pearson’s correlation between number of events attended (relative) and perceived 
influence 
Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Total 
0.365 -0.229 0.246 0.400* 0.145 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
 
The interactions between the actors in these events are predominantly multilateral 
formal (but also informal) meetings, similar for example to the Pharma collective 
bargaining in Netherlands. However, there are differences considering the side: while the 
34.6% of the employer side actors consider the informal multilateral meetings the most 
important form of interaction in the CB process, only the half of the union side (17.9%) 
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consider the same. Same divergence respect to the sex of the actors, with more men 
(30.8%) than women (13.3%) seeing informal multilateral meetings as most important. 
Anyhow, formal multilateral events are always considered the most important disregard of 
side or sex. 
 
Table 2: Averages comparison of main challenges for coordinating in regard to bargaining 
side (1 = irrelevant | 5 = extremely relevant). 
 Employer Union Total 
Lack of trust 2.56 2.98 2.79 
Power differences 2.61 3.02 2.85 
Fragmentation in the representation of workers or 
firms 
3.00 2.88 2.93 
Obstacles from economic and/or sectorial context 3.66 3.24 3.42 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
  
While in Spain there are no pattern settlers for wage setting, that is, other sectors 
that determine to a greater or lesser extent the wage setting in the chemical pharma sector, 
it does seem more common in other countries (whether sectoral or company agreements). 
In regard to the main challenges for the coordination of the collective bargaining process in 
the chemical / pharma sector in Spain, the survey results show that the main obstacles are 
related to the economic and sector context, and therefore are exogenous causes to the 
actors (table 2). In any case, exploratory interviews with both employer and union actors 
show that the division between unions is also a major obstacle, especially with regard to 
specific clauses (national standardization of wage increases, forms of flexibility and the 
introduction of private pension plans) but also when evaluating the agreement. 
 
Contact networks 
 
As already mentioned, the success of the Chemical / Pharmaceutical sector negotiation 
process is largely based on the relationships of trust between the actors, established during 
decades of negotiation. This apparent simplicity in the relationships allows, on the one 
hand, the negotiation process of each agreement to proceed without notable conflicts 
through the formal events and, when appear disagreements difficult to negotiate, informal 
interactions and events help to solve them. Although, informal events serve in general terms 
to create consensus environments, either between both parties (e.g. informal dinner 
between negotiating and related actors) or on each side (e.g. “days of coexistence” of the 
employer side). Thus, the implementation of a relational approach to collective bargaining 
in the sector can allow to explore the mechanisms whereby actors in the network negotiate 
and try to reach the agreement of other actors (particularly to the role of informality), but 
also to distinguish the role played by trade unions and employers in the bargaining network. 
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Graph 2: Contact networks in the Chemical / Pharmaceutical sector (links ≤5 have been 
removed for better visual interpretation (scale from 0 = never to 8 = very frequently)) 
              
Legend: [Label: id] [Link size: frequency (sum)] [Node size: influence] [Node Color: side (Blue = union / Green = 
employer)] 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
 
Considering the average ties strength (that can be interpreted as a measure of 
density that takes into account the weight of each tie), the differences between ties within 
employer side (6.08 over a maximum of 8) and within union side (5.04) together with the 
low average tie strength number between unions (2.23) show that even considering the 
balanced relations of the Chemical CB process in Spain, employer actors have more density 
in the network. That is, the better coordination of the employer side through cohesion 
mechanisms have effect on more frequent and established (formal and informal) relations 
between its actors. On the contrary, union actors limit their interactions to the formal events, 
being much more infrequent than employers, which influences to the problems of 
fragmentation of workers representatives. 
 
Graph 3: Communities (subgroups) in the contact network 
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Legend: [Label: id] [Link size: frequency (sum)] [Node size: influence] [Node Color: side (Blue = union / Green = 
employer)] 
Note: Subgroups within the network have been computed based on Louvain clustering with edge weighting. 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
 
In this manner, we can observe this different coordination of both sides observing 
communities within the contact network (Graph 3). Thus, we observe that the employer side 
subgroup has stronger ties among all its members, due to the important coordination work 
at the national level of the chemical employer association with all its sub-sectoral and 
regional members. Likewise, the actors of the labour lawyers firm working for the employer 
association fulfil the role of intermediary with the union part, establishing trust relations 
with the union actors (Graph 3). Above all, it should be noted the actor V, a senior member 
of that organization who, despite no longer actively participating in the negotiation process, 
plays a conciliatory role between the parties through formal and informal interactions. 
 
Union actors show much less interaction, mainly due to their organizational 
fragmentation: on the one hand, there is no real organizational structure that unifies the 
union side (the two unions coordinate with each other through the so-called union platform 
prior to the start of the negotiating agreement process). On the other hand, each union has 
internal structures at regional level, which also requires significant work to implement 
consensus mechanisms prior to the CB process (pre-negotiation days) and internal 
democracy mechanisms to ratify the agreement reached (regional assemblies of 
validation). The implementation of these mechanisms, essential to maintain consensus and 
internal democracy within unions, may entail less intra-coordination compared to 
employers. 
 
Graph 4. Co-attendance network from affiliation data (complete view, weighted data). 
 
Legend: [Label: id] [Link size: frequency (sum)] [Node size: influence] [Node Color: side (Blue = union / Green = 
employer)] 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
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Putting these interactions in the context of the attendance to events in the 
framework of the negotiation process of the agreement, most of the actors of both sides 
participate in the majority of detected events, although with greater assiduity in the 
employer side (Graph 4 and 5). This can be related to the greater importance of the 
organizational structure of unions in regional federations, delegating the attendance of 
most negotiation events to the responsible actors at the national level and segmenting 
intra-union events by union and regions. On the other hand, most of employers’ side actors 
attend to most of the CB process events, both intra-side and with unions. 
 
Graph 5. Co-attendance network from affiliation data (reduced view, simplified & binary 
data). 
 
 
Legend: [Label: id] [Link size: frequency (sum)] [Node size: influence] [Node Color: side (Blue = union / Green = 
employer)] 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
 
 
4.2. The Retail Trade Sector in Spain 
 
4.2.1. Socio-economic situation and structure of the sector 
 
The retail is a strategic sector in the Spanish economy, not only because of the size and 
employment it generates, but also because it is a good mirror for the great changes that 
are taking place in the global economy.  
 
The retail sector accounts for 13% of the Spanish GDP and it is the one that 
concentrates the highest share of employment, with 15.5% of total employment (around 
three million jobs), in addition to having the most stable jobs, since 77.5% of wage earners 
have a permanent contract, 2.3 percentage points above the average for the Spanish 
economy. Moreover, the sector has strong positive effects on other sectors of the economy, 
since, taking into account direct, indirect and induced effects, the incidence of commerce 
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on total activity and employment is approximately equivalent to 30% of GVA and 
employment. Another characteristic of employment in retail trade sector is a high incidence 
of part-time, particularly among women. In 2019, 15.9% of employees in the sector had a 
part-time job, compared to 14.6 average in the economy. In the case of women, 24.6% had 
part-time jobs in 2019 compared to only 7.4 of men. 
 
Graph 6. Employment in Wholesale and Retail trade as a % of total employment, 2008-
2019 
 
Source: Active Population Survey (INE) 
 
Employment in the retail sector is distributed equally between men and women, 
that is, with a percentage of practically 50% for both groups, and that it is one of the sectors 
with the highest productivity gains between 2000 and 2018. In this period, total productivity 
increased by 44.3% in retail, more than double the increase registered in all the other 
sectors in the economy, which was 18.6%.  
 
According to the Annual Retail Survey, this sector is made up of 762,388 companies 
in Spain and the turnover of these companies reached 770,133 million euros. In addition, 
the investment carried out by retail rose to 11,370 million euros in 2017. 
 
The weight of retail in Spain in 2018 was higher than the average of the European 
Union countries (13% of GVA in Spain, compared to 11.2% in Europe) and also higher than 
the four main European economies (Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom).  
 
The retail sector in Spain is characterized by a dual structure. On the one side, 
around 95% of the companies in the sector have less than ten employees, representing 
46.2% of the whole workforce in the sector, and their revenue is around thirty percent of 
the total.  On the other side, large retailers account for 0.1% of all retail companies and 
their revenue is around 30% but the workers involved are around 25% of the retail workforce 
(INE 2018). As pointed out by CEOE in a recent report ‘The role of small businesses is still 
very relevant", (CEOE 2019). The average is 4 people employed per company in Spanish 
retail (the same as the service sector as a whole), with a percentage of self-employed that 
almost reaches 12%, compared to an average of 9.3% for the EU28 o of 7.2% for the group 
of countries integrated in the EU4 (Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom).  
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Considering the distribution of employment according to company size, CEOE 
(2019) also appreciates a notable polarization in retail between companies with less than 
10 workers and the largest (250 or more employed), something that is common with the 
EU4 and the EU28, although in the Spanish case it is less important. 
 
4.2.2. Single and multi-employer collective bargaining in Large Retail in Spain 
 
Collective bargaining in the retail trade sector in Spain is also dualized along company size. 
Whilst large retailers have their own collective agreement at national sector level, small 
retailers and other activities within the retail trade sector develop collective bargaining at 
several levels. Thus, the Spanish retail trade sector is characterized by high level of sectoral 
agreements, signed for each subsector and changing in relation to the territorial coverage 
national, regional or provincial.  
 
The network analysis of collective bargaining has been carried out for the 
negotiation of the large retailers and department stores collective agreement (Convenio 
Colectivo de Grandes Almacenes, Collective Agreement of Large Retailers) signed in May 
2017. This collective agreement was signed at national level and applies to all those 
member companies of ANGED (Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de la 
Distribución, National Association of Large Retailers). Moreover, the collective agreement 
also applies to those companies whose purpose is a retail activity mainly dedicated to the 
mixed retail trade in medium and large stores, with one or more work centers organized by 
departments, provided they meet at the national level, as a company or group of 
companies, a sales area not less than 30,000 square meters, in some of the following 
modalities: a) Department stores, offering a wide assortment of various product ranges 
(mainly articles for household equipment, clothing, footwear, perfumery, food, etc.); b) 
hypermarkets, understood as those companies that have one or more retail establishments 
offering self-service on a wide assortment of food and non-food products; and c) Large 
specialized stores, offering a broad assortment of a particular product or range of products, 
either in self-service or with the assistance of some sales staff. According to the collective 
agreement, around 230,000 workers are covered by it. Some of the companies covered by 
this collective agreement are: El Corte Ingles, IKEA, Apple Retail, Carrefour, FNAC, Leroy 
Merlin, Conforama, C&A, MediaMarkt, Worten, Bricomart, among others.  
 
Several trade unions were represented in the negotiation process. Unlike most 
sectors in the Spanish economy, the largest trade unions in the large retail sector are not 
the two most representative at national level (CCOO and UGT). The most important trade 
union in the sector is FETICO (Federación de Trabajadores Independientes de Comercio), an 
independent  trade union created in the late 1970s as a result of mergers between trade 
unions of different department stores. FETICO has nowadays around 65,000 members and 
is the largest and most representative trade union in the retail trade sector, with 52.6% of 
elected representatives in works’ councils elections by 31st March 2019. In addition to the 
large retailers agreement, FETICO is also involved in company level collective bargaining of 
companies like Brico-Depot, Primark, Vips, Eroski etc. The second largest trade union in the 
large retail sector is FASGA (Federación de Asociaciones Sindicales de Grandes 
Almacenes). FASGA is another independent trade union with most members in the retail 
trade sector, and with a particularly important role in companies like El Corte Inglés. FASGA 
has around 41,000 members in sectors like retail trade, financial services, marketing etc. 
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and has 17.03% of elected representatives in works’ councils elections by 31st March 
2019. It is involved in collective bargaining both at sectoral and company level. The third 
trade union in the retail trade sector is the Service Federation of CCOO, followed by FeSMC-
UGT with 15.21% of elected representatives in works’ councils elections respectively. Graph 
7 contains the distribution of representatives in the bargaining table of the collective 
agreements for large retail signed in 2013 and 2017. 
 
Graph 7. Trade union representatives in the bargaining table of the Large Retailers collective 
agreement, 2013 and 2017 
 
Source: REGCON, Registro de Convenios Colectivos 
 
One of the defining traits of the large retail sector is the dominance by the 
independent trade unions FETICO and FASGA, accused by CCOO and UGT of being ‘yellow’ 
or company trade unions, i.e., a worker organization influenced or dominated by an 
employer or group of employers. These conflicts in the union side explain why CCOO and 
UGT didn’t sign previous collective agreements in the large retail trade sector, including the 
one signed in 2013.  
 
For the negotiation of the 2017 collective agreement, FETICO placed as a priority to 
get CCOO and UGT sign it, unlike what had happened in 2013. In order to overcome the 
conflicts and resistances, the process of negotiation with ANGED was preceded by a series 
of meetings (both formal and informal, bilateral and multilateral) among all trade unions in 
order to reach common positions on those topics that had encountered the opposition of 
some trade unions to sign the previous agreement. In the case of the 2017 bargaining 
round, these issues were the wage increases, working time and work on Sundays and 
Holidays. More specifically, CCOO and UGT heavily criticised the terms and conditions 
agreed by FETICO and FASGA in the 2013 collective agreement, in the context of the 
financial and economic crisis, that led to an increase in working time, a reduction in real 
wages and a worsening of working conditions (including the extension of atypical forms of 
employment) for employees in the large retail trade sector.  
 
Moreover, before the start of negotiations with the rest of trade unions, CCOO 
engaged into a consultation with workers on the sector around their priorities in relation to 
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the new collective agreement. The results of that consultation put four topic at the top of 
workers’ priorities: improvement in real wages, limitations in work on Sundays and 
Holidays, conciliation of work and family, and the distribution of working time.  
 
Only when an agreement amongst all trade unions on these topics was reached, 
negotiations with employers started. The importance of these preparatory union meetings 
can be seen in the short time it took to negotiate the collective agreement with employers; 
the bargaining table was set up in January 2017 and an agreement was reached in May 
2017. Moreover, having a unitary position on the union side, allowed unions to enjoy a 
stronger position vis-à-vis employers in the negotiation process. According to CCOO, for the 
first time, there has been a real negotiation process of the collective agreement, as all their 
proposals in relation to the new collective agreement were debated with the rest of trade 
unions and the employers. For this reason, the relationship between FETICO (as the largest 
trade union) and CCOO (as the largest trade union not signing the 2013 agreement) was 
particularly important in the bargaining process.  
 
Given the importance of the agreement that for the first time had obtained the 
signature of all trade unions involved in the large retail sector, the collective agreement was 
signed in the CES (Economic and Social Council) in May 2019. 
 
4.2.3. Network Analysis of CB in Large Retail: Survey Results 
 
Response rates, sample description, influence and involvement 
 
The implementation of the network survey in the retail sector has been characterised by the 
positive and collaborative stance of most actors interviewed and contacted in the 
exploratory stages of the project. These exploratory interviews were carried out in May-June 
2019, two years after the collective agreement in the large retail sector was signed. 
However, this cooperative stance has not always translated into a high number of responses 
to the network survey. A total of 10 survey responses were received, out of a 25-network 
size, thus leading to a 40% response rate. Despite the signature of the last collective 
agreement in 2017, one reason explaining this low response rate is the conflict between 
the independent and the class trade unions with representation in the sector. However, the 
ex-post delimitation of network size considering only those actors with a minimum level of 
influence in the network (therefore effectively eliminating those actors whose role in the 
network is marginal), the response rate is 46%. Moreover, when we consider those actors 
that are perceived as the most relevant by the rest of actors in the network (perceived 
influence on wage-setting higher than 3.5 (median value from a minimum of 1 and a 
maximum of 5 in a Likert scale), the response rate goes up to 62%, meaning that many of 
the important actors have answered the survey. As a matter of fact, the three largest trade 
unions in the sector answered the survey, together with the employer organisation.  
 
The exploratory network was composed by a majority of actors from the four trade 
unions involved in collective bargaining (22) and three actors from the employer 
organisation involved in collective bargaining in the sector (3). One member of the employer 
organisation and nine union members answered the survey. Most of the actors answering 
the survey had a political profile, and only one of them had a technical role in collective 
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bargaining in the retail sector. Finally, the majority of respondents were males (7) and only 
3 were women.  
Notwithstanding a relatively low response rate, the exploration of non respondents 
shows that the basic characteristics of the network remain. In the case of large retail, those 
who have not answered the survey but were included as contacts by those responding to it, 
occupied a peripheral position in the network and do not seem to alter the basic structure 
and the characteristics of the network.  
 
Event attendance, form of interaction and main challenges for coordinating 
 
In this project, the events refer to any significant development for wage-setting in a given 
sector, in the period under consideration, involving more than two actors, and with a direct 
influence / impact on wage setting in this sector. In the case of large retail in Spain, events 
referring to the negotiation of the last sectoral collective agreement were considered. 
Negotiations for this agreement started officially in January 2017 with the creation of the 
bargaining table and ended in May 2017 with the signature of a new collective agreement 
until 2020. In the five-month period that negotiations lasted, several events (including 
meetings, creation of union platforms for negotiations etc.) occurred. Given the 
fragmentation on the union side with four trade unions, events aiming at reaching a 
common position among unions were particularly relevant provided the history of conflicts 
and rivalries between them. As a matter of fact, the interview with a representative of the 
important trade union in the retail sector, revealed the importance of these events, and 
pointed to them as the key to unlock negotiations. The other events included in the 
questionnaire consisted of official meetings between unions and employers in the context 
of the re-negotiation of the collective agreement.   
In the case of large retail in Spain, the mean of event attendance is almost seven. 
This means that actors involved in the collective bargaining process attended most of the 
events related to the negotiation. As a matter of fact, the relative attendance in the case of 
large retail in Spain is almost 85% (meaning that each actor has attended, on average, 85% 
of the events included in the survey). That shows a high level of commitment of those 
involved in the process, even of those with a political role in the bargaining process or with 
more influence. Moreover, even though event attendance does not necessarily mean higher 
influence, in the case of Spain, given the low levels of rotation among those involved in 
negotiations, there is a relationship between the degree of attendance and perceived 
influence. 
 
The dominant form of interactions during the bargaining process in large retail in 
Spain, consisted of multilateral meetings, either formal or informal. The exploratory 
interviews revealed the importance of trust building process amongst actors, particularly in 
the union side, due to the confrontation experienced in previous processes of negotiation. 
Those interviewed highlighted the importance of sharing information and reaching common 
positions within all union actors involved in order to avoid misunderstandings and false 
expectations.  
 
When asked about the main challenges social partners face in order to reach an 
agreement and coordinate their actions, the actors surveyed point to the economic context 
as the main problem, followed by power imbalances between unions and employers. 
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Surprisingly, fragmentation on the union side does not come out as the most important 
challenge for coordination in the large retail sector. This could be explained by the specific 
context of the last round of negotiations of the sectoral collective agreement, where all 
trade union represented in the bargaining table made an effort to overcome their 
differences and agree on a collective agreement.  
 
Contact networks 
 
The first element of a relational approach to the analysis of collective bargaining consists 
in looking at the links between actors in the network. This is what we call contact networks. 
Contact networks can be explored either by considering all frequencies of contact, with 8 
average number of ties with other actors (Graph 8), or by establishing a minimum threshold 
of contact (e.g. removing links ≤5 in a scale from 0 = never to 8 = very frequently), reducing 
the number of ties to 5.8 (Graph 9).  
 
Graph 8. Contact networks in Large Retail (all frequencies of contact included) 
 
 
 
Graph 9. Contact networks in the Large Retail sector 
 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
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A first aspect coming out from the analysis of contact networks is that all actors in 
the large retail sector in Spain have links with the other actors in the networks. This is what 
we call density of contacts, i.e., the number of edges (an edge is a tie between two actors 
of any frequency –i.e., any value excluding 0) divided by the maximum possible provided 
the number of actors. The index reaches a maximum of 1 when every actor is tied to each 
other. This is coherent with event attendance data, that showed a high level for actors in 
large retail in Spain.  
 
Moreover, the contact network for large retail in Spain is also characterised by being 
very decentralised. The degree centralization is a measure of how centralised a network in 
relation to the maximum attained degree is. The index reaches a maximum of 1 when a 
single actor is tied to each other, and the others are only tied with the former (thus, 
indicating a maximum centralization). The index attains a minimum value of 0 when all 
actors have the same degree (thus, indicating minimum centralization). During the 
bargaining round, all actors have maintained contacts with the rest of actors in the network, 
without any of them playing a particularly salient role during the bargaining round. This is 
consistent with the idea transmitted by one of the interviewees from the largest trade union 
in the sector, that in its aim to make all trade unions sign the agreement, tried to avoid any 
saliency during the negotiation by having a similar number of representatives in the 
bargaining table. Minimum centralization can also indicate dispersed power in the network, 
which is also in line with the objective of involving all trade unions in the negotiation process 
and build trust with them. 
The analysis of ties within the large retail network also shows a high density of 
relations among those actors in the network. In a bargaining process, building trust is key 
in order to reach an agreement. Among other things, trust building in the process depends 
on all actors sharing information and having (frequent) contacts. For this reason, we have 
computed the average ties strength, a measure that takes into account the weight of each 
tie (from 0 to 8). It is the total of all values divided by the number of possible ties and can 
be interpreted as a measure of density that takes into account the weight of each tie. The 
large retail in Spain has a high average ties strength, thus pointing to a dense network 
whose actors have been involved at all stages of the negotiation process. That density 
remains even when we consider non-respondents. All non respondents (except one) had at 
least 4 contacts with different respondents of the network, therefore confirming a very 
dense, highly cohesive contact network. 
 
Graph 10. Communities (subgroups) in the contact network 
 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
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The analysis of subgroups within the network shows two of them (see graph 10). 
Due to the existence of a single employer, the subgroups identified do not correspond to 
the two sides of the industry. The first if composed by trade unions and employers. The 
second, is composed by members of the same trade union. This second subgroup might 
respond to the need to coordinate within the trade union a common strategy in relation to 
the negotiation of the agreement. 
 
Co-attendance Networks 
 
While contact networks report information on direct, interpersonal relationships among 
actors in wage setting processes, co-attendance networks report if each pair of actors are 
close because they attended the same type of events. As any pair of actors can have 
relationships outside the wage setting process, frequency of contact and event co-
attendance are two indicators that provide slightly different information. Frequency of 
contact simply reports how often those two actors interact, both outside and within the 
bargaining process. Event co-attendance on the other side refers to the coincidence of two 
actors in the same event in the context of the bargaining process.  
 
Graph 11. Co-attendance networks from affiliation dat.  Left graph corresponds to complete 
view, weighted data. Right graph corresponds to reduced view, simplified & binary data. 
 
Source: NETWIR project Survey 
 
 
The co-attendance graphs (see graph 11) shows a symmetric picture, where all 
actors (with the exception of A; but there are other actors from the same organization like 
A that are already in the network) have attended events during the negotiation process with 
all the other actors in the network. This result is line with the high density of relations 
observed before and the importance of formal events (formal meetings in the context of 
the negotiation of the collective agreement) in the bargaining process. 
 
 
5. SECTORAL COMPARISON 
 
The two sectors compared in this report share some structural similarities, including the 
importance of large multinational companies, but their analysis has revealed significant 
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differences in terms of collective bargaining processes, bargaining networks, and the 
interactions between unions and employers. 
 
The Chemical-pharmaceutical and Large retail sectors count with bigger companies 
than national average, that contribute highly to the GDP and employment of Spain. 
However, working conditions and quality of employment are different: both sectors have 
high rates of permanent contracts, but there are much higher salaries and higher rates of 
full-timers in the chemical-pharmaceutical sector. This is somehow due to the type of 
activity developed, the average workforce skills and the market exposure. 
 
With regard to the collective bargaining process, there are also certain similarities, 
especially in the relevance of consolidated sectoral bargaining processes at the national 
level. Both sectors have national agreements that provide a framework to regulate and/or 
guide lower-scale agreements. However, while the coordination of collective bargaining in 
the retail sector is fragmented (separate processes for small and large retailers), the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors are unified. 
 
In this way, a single EO directly represents the largest retail companies in the CB 
process, while a multitude of EOs of different subsectors together with some large 
companies participate directly in the negotiation process of the chemical sector, although 
represented by the main EO of the sector. The trade union landscape is also fragmented in 
the Large retail sector, with an independent union being the most representative in the 
sector and important differences in the union side, while the two largest trade unions in 
Spain are also the most representative in the chemical sector and have similar views and 
strategies in relation to collective bargaining in the sector. 
 
The analysis of dominant forms of interactions during the bargaining process 
reveals similar patterns in the two sectors, with an important role of multilateral meetings, 
either formal or informal. However, informal interactions play a more important role in the 
chemical sector due to the long record of cooperative relations between unions and 
employers in the sector, that allows actors to begin formal bargaining processes with better 
knowledge about each organization’s position. In the large retail sector, trust building 
process amongst actors are relevant, particularly in the union side, due to the confrontation 
experienced in previous processes of negotiation. 
 
Trust building processes have a reflection in the shape and characteristics of 
networks in the two sectors: all actors in the large retail sector have links with the other 
actors in the network (high density of contacts), being the network very decentralised, 
indicating dispersed power in the network but also showing the lack of participation in 
multilateral meetings of members of the EO itself, being external advisers practically the 
only interlocutors with unions. On the contrary, the already established trust within chemical 
sector network allows that negotiation process proceed without notable conflicts through 
the formal events, although the better coordination of the employer side at national level 
have effect on more frequent and established (formal and informal) relations between its 
actors than union actors more fragmented territorially and organizationally. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This report offers the first study to date of collective bargaining processes adopting 
a relational perspective through the use of Social Network Analysis methodologies in Spain. 
The analysis of bargaining networks in the Chemical-pharmaceutical and Large retail 
sectors, allows to attain a better understanding of how collective bargaining coordination is 
achieved whilst providing a first evaluation of the potential of social network analysis to 
analyse collective bargaining. 
 
The comparative analysis of bargaining processes in the two sectors reveals how 
successful collective bargaining processes are not alike. Though in the two cases 
negotiations accomplished their objectives and delivered an agreement, they diverged 
significantly as to how this was achieved, and more specifically, in the methods to build and 
maintain trust, shared beliefs and power (Öberg et al. 2002). In some cases, actors can 
initially hold same opinion on key matters, allowing direct negotiations on potentially 
conflictual issues that can be solved through alternative/informal mechanisms between 
organizations and the intervention of those actors who concentrates more power within 
their organizations, but also being well connected with opposed organizations. That is 
mainly the case of the chemical collective bargaining process in Spain. In other cases, the 
lack of shared beliefs is solved through network building processes to raise closeness. That 
may allow the emergence of trustful relations, reducing both uncertainty and information 
asymmetries in the interactions between actors (Coleman 1988). That may well describe 
Large retail bargaining process case. 
 
Being the first explorative attempt at analysing collective bargaining processes 
using social network analysis in Spain, the results already suggest the large potential of this 
methodology for better understanding collective bargaining. More specifically, using the 
relational approach to negotiation processes and the analysis of bargaining networks, helps 
to shed light into the processes underpinning coordination, the mechanisms sustaining 
trust and the different forms of interaction that occur in bargaining processes. The potential 
of this relational approach for the study of collective bargaining, through the use of social 
network methodology to the study of coordination results, trust and power relations 
between actors can potentially the knowledge about collective bargaining coordination in 
Spain in many ways: helping to understand which are the mechanisms sustaining 
coordination (trust, shared beliefs or power), and how far these mechanisms or the 
existence of peak cross sectoral agreements governing and coordinating collective 
bargaining, that characterized Spanish industrial relations system, is a determining factor. 
 
One of the important messages coming out from the analysis presented in this 
report is the need to look more closely at the informal mechanisms sustaining bargaining 
processes. These informal, ‘coffee and cigarette’ processes are very often key to overcome 
a deadlock in negotiations. Therefore, proper consideration is required in order to 
understand how coordination is actually happening. Moreover, the relational approach to 
collective bargaining also provides empirical evidence to understand how trust is built and 
maintained within bargaining networks.    
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